Genesis
On January 6, 2016, North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test at the Punggyeri nuclear test site, approximately 50 kilometers northwest of Kilju City, North Hamkyeong Province. (Figure 1 ) It was the second nuclear detonation under the leadership of Kim Jong Un. Unlike the past three tests, North Korea claimed it was a 'hydrogen bomb. ' 1 This is, however, speculated to in fact be a kind of boosted 'fission' weapon by nations including the US, China, and South Korea; it is due to the consequent 5.1 magnitude earthquake 2 with its epicenter at the nuclear test site, being notably similar to the earthquake size that was accompanied by the 2013 nuclear test by North Korea. Source: Compiled by the author North Korea's nuclear test was instantly responded to with severe criticism by the international community. The US, Japan, and South Korea referred to it as a serious violation of international law, and the UN Security Council adopted a resolution towards complete nuclear non-proliferation. 5 China and Russia also condemned the 1 See North Korea says it tested hydrogen bomb, nk news, Jan. 6, 2016, available at http://www.nknews.org/2016/01/ north-korea-says-it-tested-hydrogen-bomb (last visited on May 3, 2016). North Korea's actions. 6 To make matters worse, however, North Korea launched a long-range rocket on February 7, 2016, named Kwangmyongsong-4 (광명성) at the Tongchang-ri satellite launch site near its northwestern border with China. 7 Despite prior notification to the International Maritime Organization of the launch of an earth observation satellite, the international community severely reprimanded North Korea of its rocket launch, which is believed to be part of its developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear bomb. 8 It was
another violation of a series of Security Council resolutions prohibiting North Korea from developing ballistic-missile technologies. 
Resolution 2270
North Korea's nuclear test and succeeding rocket launch brought a strong response from the UN. On March 2, 2016, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2270, imposing strong sanctions against North Korea. 10 The resolution was approved by the members of the Council after nearly two months' painstaking negotiations after the January 6 nuclear test, a time period longer than the average number of days for previous resolutions. The Security Council condemned North Korea's nuclear test as well as the rocket launch that used ballistic missile technology as being "in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant resolutions, thereby constituting a challenge to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") and to peace and stability in the region and beyond." See N Korean nuclear test condemned as intolerable provocation, channel newsasia, Jan. 6, 2016, available at http:// www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/n-korean-nuclear-test/2404166.html; O. Gertcyk, Russia condemns North Korea's 'nuclear bomb test', a 'threat to national security,' siberian times, Jan. 6, 2016, available at http:// siberiantimes.com/other/others/news/n0545-russia-condemns-north-koreas-nuclear-bomb-test-a-threat-to-nationalsecurity (all last visited on Apr. 12, 2016). 
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The September 19 Joint Statement was an iconic turning point toward a peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear dispute. However, it was not implemented because North Korea strongly protested against the US freezing its secret fund in the Banco Delta Asia Bank of Macao. 25 Responding to this financial block, on October 
Frustrations

A. Rule of Law
The North Korean nuclear weapons development has been one of the most serious issues faced by the international community since the early 1990s. For the past ten years, in particular, the UN Security Council has consistently delivered strong economic sanctions against North Korea in response to each of its nuclear tests; however, they did not successfully stop the nuclear crisis. Such frustrations are especially due to critical legal loopholes in the NPT. The core purpose of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further achieve nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. 37 However, the NPT is distorted by its inherent double standard; it is composed of both the five "recognized nuclear weapon States," who are legitimately entitled to have nuclear weapons under the Treaty, and the 185 "other non-nuclear weapon States" who have agreed never to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. This unbalanced bargain has been maintained mainly through two legal and policy initiatives: (1) the 'nuclear umbrella,' which "refers to a guarantee by a nuclear weapons state to defend a nonnuclear allied state" 38 and (2) 'nuclear disarmament,' which refers to "reducing and Another serious problem regarding the NPT is that non-signatories who are believed to possess nuclear weapons -India, Pakistan and Israel -have not been sanctioned for their positions opting out of the NPT. Considering that North Korea was severely sanctioned by Security Council Resolution 825 (1993) just for declaring its withdrawal from the Treaty, these three countries are treated more favorably than North Korea, which cried 'unfairness' on the part of the international community. Actually, Article X of the NPT grants each party the right to withdraw from the Treaty when "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country" 44 by giving three months'
notice. Such an easy withdrawal route would attract more parties without much introspection. This provision was presumed to be adopted in order to substitute weak normal powers of the NPT with global extension of parties.
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Today, 'nonproliferation' is aligned with 'nuclear terrorism.' 45 It is, however, unequal to the North Korean nuclear test because 'terrorism' is mainly associated with Non-State Actors ("NSAs"). 46 North Korea does not qualify as an NSA, but a UN Member State out of the purview of the NPT. It can effectively bind North Korea only when each NWS is respecting those rules and substantially reducing its nuclear weapons. Without the sincere devotion of each NWS to a nuclear free world, North Korea's recalcitrant behavior is likely to continue.
B. Governance
North Korea has been trying to develop nuclear weapons in order to overcome its regime crisis in the post-Cold War era. Following the destruction of the former Soviet Union and other socialist allies in the 1990s, as well as China's balanced approach toward the two Koreas, North Korean leadership was getting concerned about its physical security and decided to go nuclear. The nuclear weapons development program lies in a critical point of contention in regional as well as world politics. It was a kind of 'trump card' for the late Kim Jong Il to defend his regime against the severe crises from both the inside and outside, and thereby successfully shift power to his son, Kim Jong Un. Currently, the nuclear weapons program is not only an efficient measure for North Korea to compensate for its inferiority in its conventional arms race with South Korea, 47 but also a leverage for negotiations with the US and China. What if North Korea had abolished its nuclear weapons program in its early stage? Kim would have supposed his regime could not be sustained. Iran and Libya were probably good lessons for Kim Jong Un. This is precisely why North Korea desperately clings to its nuclear weapons program, despite the severe condemnation and isolation from the international community.
Up until 2008, North Korea's denuclearization question had been discussed via the Six-Party Talks. As mentioned above, the talks were triggered by the second nuclear crisis, in which North Korea re-declared withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, against the "tailored containment policy" of the US. 48 In The current deadlock is caused by the failure of coordinating strategic interests among the key actors of the Six-Party Talks. In particular, the US and North Korea are seeking denuclearization from diametrically opposite sides. North Korea claims that as nuclear weapons program is a self-defense measure from the potential (nuclear) attack of the US and South Korea, their security should be guaranteed first by the US before denuclearization. 51 North Korea requires the US to conclude the 'peace treaty,' which finalizes the current 'armistice' and to lift the sanctions for economic recovery. 52 Such positions were well reflected in the provisions of the has not been open for the past eight years. The more the US and South Korea press North Korea, the more North Korea resists with nuclear tests.
Two-Track Approach
As mentioned above, Resolution 2270 releases tougher sanction measures than any other resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning nuclear tests. It contains "further significant measures," which were mentioned in Resolution 2094 (2013). Resolution 2270 was followed by the US Congress' "North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016" 55 accompanied by the 'secondary boycott' provision (February 10) as well as South Korea's closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was a symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation (February 11). 56 Both the US and South Korea expect North Korea to ultimately abandon its nuclear weapons program. China, however, has the key to effectively implementing the resolution. This is because unprecedentedly tough sanctions could be adopted as a compromise between the US and China. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: "Sanctions are necessary, and maintaining stability is the pressing priority, and only negotiations could provide a fundamental solution 制裁是必要手段，维稳是当务 之急，谈判是根本之道." 57 In this sense, China is willing to defend its strategic interest in this region by sustaining the political status quo of North Korea's Kim Jong Un regime. 58 It would be, however, inconsistent with the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" 59 doctrine for maintaining American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.
Their standoff could seriously exacerbate the North Korean nuclear crisis. The best option to break such ongoing nuclear deadlock will be the "TwoTrack Approach," which conceives both 'peacemaking' and 'denuclearization' simultaneously. It is a more proactive initiative developed from "a comprehensive and integrated approach" of the William Perry Report. 60 Both the Geneva Agreed
Framework and the September 19 Joint Statement refer to a peace regime based on mutual trust between the US and North Korea. Therefore, a peace treaty should be the other important agenda item for denuclearization negotiation. A stable peace regime will be a basis for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Such a new approach will provide ample space to discuss the nuclear crisis in a more peaceful setting.
As an acting plan for peace regime building, the nuclear weapons free zone in Northeast Asia ("NEA-NWFZ") should be suggested. It is a fair and reasonable way to bring North Korea back to the contemporary nuclear deterrence system. The NWFZ would mean "a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test or possess nuclear weapons." 61 It is also defined by the UN General Assembly as:
Any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby: (a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined; (b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.
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NWFZ is closely associated with core values of the NPT for nuclear arms control. NPT also provides the right for any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure a total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective areas. 63 According to this rule, as of today, five regional NWFZs are successfully maintaining nuclear free regions.
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The NEA-NWFZ would include the Korean Peninsula, three prefectures of northeastern mainland China, Japan, and Far-East Russia. In this geographical scope, the six countries and the UN can mutually guarantee not to manufacture, acquire, test, accrue, or possess nuclear weapons. There is no objection from the US, China, or Russia. North Korea is also affirmative to this regional NWFZ. 65 
UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon previously suggested the establishment of the NWFZ as one of the five proposals for nuclear disarmament. 66 Such a collective certified framework for denuclearization would place North Korea back into the nonproliferation system. The North Korean nuclear weapons development program must be abolished in a "comprehensive, verifiable and irrevocable" manner as soon as possible. Denuclearization of North Korea, however, is not pre-condition for the process, but the final result of all the negotiations. Technically, a sudden denuclearization is impossible. What is urgently needed is a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, not a fundamental regime change of North Korea. A freer and more open North Korea should be coming after painstaking course.
Conclusion
The fourth Washington Nuclear Security Summit adopted the Communiqué on April 1, 2016 (hereinafter, Washington Communiqué). The leaders agreed to strengthen "the nuclear security architecture at national, regional and global levels, including through broadened ratification and implementation of international legal instruments regarding nuclear security." 67 The Washington Communiqué is deeply concerned with North Korea's nuclear weapons development as a serious violation of international law and the global consensus for a nuclear secure world. In Washington, they have agreed to cooperate to ease nuclear tension. Nonetheless, North Korea is not expected to stop the nuclear weapons program because of the loopholes of the current NPT system and the distorted structure of regional politics, which can be understood as a 'Hostile Co-existence.'Both sides take advantage of this continuing pattern. Each side has been stimulating the other in order to expand its domestic and regional interests. The 2016 US-
